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Introduction
Mutual fund regulation is plagued by conflicting impulses. On the
one hand, funds are critical investment vehicles that millions of
Americans depend on for retirement. These Americans have varying
levels of sophistication and resources, and mutual fund regulation is
designed to ensure that they are sold products that are appropriate for
their needs and risk tolerance levels, at a reasonable fee.
Mutual funds are also, increasingly, a devastatingly powerful
economic force. As trillions of dollars flows into these vehicles, the asset
managers who control them exercise tremendous influence over where
capital flows, how corporations will govern themselves, and what
priorities corporate managers will pursue. Regulation is therefore
needed not only to ensure that this power is used to benefit investors
in the funds, but also to address the very real legitimacy problem that
arises when private actors are able to exercise such overweening
authority over resource allocation throughout the economy.
Unfortunately, the regulations needed to address these two very
different types of problems are often at cross-purposes. Regulations that
benefit retirement savers in the short-term may, in the long-term,
increase asset managers’ power in uncomfortable ways. Asset managers’
long-term stewardship over portfolio investments may neglect the
immediate interests of individual fund beneficiaries.

†

Michael M. Fleishman Associate Professor in Business Law and
Entrepreneurship, Tulane Law School.
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This Essay will discuss some of the tensions inherent in mutual fund
regulatory policy and discuss potential paths forward.

I.

Competition

The mutual fund has become the most popular vehicle for American
investment.1 These shell entities permit retail investors to reap the
benefits of a diversified portfolio under professional management, for a
fee that is deducted periodically from fund assets. As regulatory changes
encouraged employers to favor 401(k) plans over traditional pension
plans,2 retirement assets gradually shifted into mutual funds, and now
U.S. investment companies hold assets worth $26 trillion.3 Though
institutions—like pension funds—may also invest in mutual funds, and
some retail investors purchase shares outside the context of retirement
planning, mutual funds are also overwhelmingly used as retirement
vehicles for individual savers.4
For those who choose to invest in mutual funds, a wide variety of
options are available. Many mutual funds track an index—namely, a
sample of companies selected according to some specific criteria, such
as to mirror the market more generally, or to mirror the performance
of large cap companies—and the fund (and thus fund investors) pay a
licensing fee to the index creator.5 Alternatively, for higher fees,
investors can choose a mutual fund subject to “active” management,
namely, a bespoke selection of investments chosen by the fund portfolio
manager.6 These categories—index, or passive, investing, versus active
investing—are not necessarily all that far apart; though many index
funds track a broad, widely followed index created by an independent
entity,7 many indexes are created by affiliates of the mutual fund
companies themselves according to specific criteria, and are followed by
only a small number (or even a single) fund.8
1.

William A. Birdthistle, Empire of the Fund: The Way We Save
Now 6 (2016).

2.

See Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder
Primacy, 43 Seton Hall L. Rev. 909, 930–31 (2013).

3.

Inv. Co. Inst., Investment Company Fact Book, at xii (60th ed.
2020).

4.

Birdthistle, supra note 1, at 6, 8–9.

5.

See Adriana Z. Robertson, Passive in Name Only: Delegated Management
and “Index” Investing, 36 Yale J. on Regul. 795, 847 (2019).

6.

See id. at 802.

7.

See Johannes Petry, Jan Fichtner & Eelke Heemskerk, Steering Capital:
The Growing Private Authority of Index Providers in the Age of Passive
Asset Management, 28 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 152, 153 (2019).

8.

Robertson, supra note 5, at 850.

1276

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 4·2021
A Most Ingenious Paradox

Unfortunately, many retail investors purchase shares of funds that
underperform relative to other available options, whether due to their
investment selection, fees, or a combination of both. Multiple funds
track the exact same index, differing, in practical effect, only in the fees
charged.9 Active funds, or bespoke indexes, may not be any better.
Frequently, they charge high fees that erode into investment returns,
and cannot consistently outperform the cheaper passive funds that
follow a broad segment of the market.10 Retail investors may find
themselves investing in funds that take on too much risk relative to
their needs, and as a result see the value of their investment collapse
just when they need it for retirement.11 Funds may bill themselves as
following particularly strategies—such as “sustainability” or “ESG” or
value or growth—but the fine print demonstrates that the proposed
strategy does not match the funds’ investments or its voting and
engagement behavior.12
In a functioning market, competition would eliminate these highfee, underperforming funds. And to some extent, that has happened;
fees have dropped overall,13 and investors have dramatically reallocated
their dollars from active to passive funds in the past several years
(which probably explains the proliferation of purported “index” funds
that appear to reallocate what would otherwise be management fees
into index licensing fees).14 Yet problems in the market persist, in large
part because many retail investors are either unsophisticated about
their options, or cannot afford the search costs associated with
identifying more suitable choices.15

9.

See Jacob Hale Russell, The Separation of Intelligence and Control:
Retirement Savings and the Limits of Soft Paternalism, 6 Wm. & Mary
Bus. L. Rev. 35, 62 (2015); Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital
Allocation, 78 Ohio St. L.J. 181, 199 (2017); Birdthistle, supra note
1, at 78.

10.

Birdthistle, supra note 1, at 26–27.

11.

Id. at 168–70.

12.

See Dana Brakman Reiser & Anne Tucker, Buyer Beware: Variation and
Opacity in ESG and ESG Index Funds, 41 Cardozo L. Rev. 1921, 1926
(2020); Huaizhi Chen, Lauren Cohen & Umit Gurun, Don’t Take Their
Word for It: The Misclassification of Bond Mutual Funds 1–4 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26423, 2020), https://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3474557 [https://perma.cc/4LK
U-ST2M].

13.

Inv. Co. Inst., supra note 3, at 118.

14.

Robertson, supra note 5, at 843.

15.

John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why
Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 Yale
L.J. 84, 114 (2010).
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Retail investors’ lack of sophistication has been extensively
documented.16 Investors have trouble understanding fee disclosures, and
basic financial concepts such as the value of diversification.17 They
frequently chase past performance as representative of future returns.18
Those who invest exclusively through a 401(k) plan are even less
sophisticated than investors as a whole, and less capable of making
prudent financial judgments.19 Mutual fund sponsors are aware of these
problems and can exploit them by targeting the most expensive funds
to the least sophisticated investors.20 The result is that the market’s
invisible hand is not sufficient to weed out the more predatory funds
and asset managers.21
There are a number of potential solutions to this problem. For
starters, funds and fund sponsors could be more tightly regulated.
Greater restrictions could be placed on fees, rather than the relatively
light-touch approach that exists now.22 Funds that follow broad indices
could come with disclosure requirements comparing their fees to similar

16.

See Jill E. Fisch, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Kristin Firth, The Knowledge
Gap in Workplace Retirement Investing and the Role of Professional
Advisors, 66 Duke L.J. 633, 634 (2016); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Securities
Law Implications of Financial Illiteracy, 104 Va. L. Rev. 1065, 1089 (2018);
Edwards, supra note 9, at 193–95.

17.

Fairfax, supra note 16, at 1083; Jill E. Fisch & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Why
Do Retail Investors Make Costly Mistakes? An Experiment on Mutual Fund
Choice, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 605, 643–44 (2014).

18.

Quinn Curtis, The Fiduciary Rule Controversy and the Future of
Investment Advice, 9 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 53, 61 (2019); Itzhak Ben-David,
Francesco Franzoni, Byungwook Kim & Rabih Moussawi, Competition for
Attention in the ETF Space 8 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper
No. 28369, 2021), https://www.nber.org/papers/w28369 [https://perma.cc
/7ARP-JJY2].

19.

Jill E. Fisch, Annamaria Lusardi & Andrea Hasler, Defined Contribution
Plans and the Challenge of Financial Illiteracy, 105 Cornell L. Rev. 741,
742 (2020).

20.

Birdthistle, supra note 1, at 77; see also Curtis, supra note 18, at 61–62;
Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in
Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of
Investor Sovereignty, 83 Wash. U. L.Q. 1017, 1033 (2005); Morley &
Curtis, supra note 15, at 130.

21.

Allen Ferrell & John Morley, New Special Study of the Securities Markets:
Institutional Intermediaries 8 (Yale L. & Econ., Rsch. Paper No. 580, 2017)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3005542 [https://pe
rma.cc/LA9B-ZJA7].

22.

See Morley & Curtis, supra note 15, at 136–40 (discussing the flaws with
the current liability regime for excessive fees and suggesting that price
regulation would be more effective); Birdthistle, supra note 1, at 80–88
(discussing problems with permitted mutual fund fees).
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funds.23 Fiduciary obligations could be placed on index providers who
create bespoke indexes or modify their indexes after consultation with
the funds they serve.24 Regulators could restrict retail investors’ ability
to invest in more esoteric funds, with licensing or sophistication require–
ments,25 not unlike current standards that limit certain investments
only to wealthy and sophisticated buyers.26
Alternatively, there could be more robust regulation of sales
channels. Currently, funds may be sold through brokers, registered
investment advisers, or dual-registered entities, and varying degrees of
fiduciary responsibility are placed on each.27 Brokers and dualregistered entities in particular may operate under conflicts that
discourage them from offering the cheapest and most appropriate
products to their customers.28 These conflicts could be regulated more
tightly, and reforms could be made to the commission structures to
discourage sales of subpar funds.29
Many funds are offered as options in a menu of choices provided by
an employer as part of a 401(k) plan, and though certain fiduciary
obligations attach to employers when constructing these menus, these
are quite minimal.30 Some progress has been made inducing lower fee

23.

Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1961, 2030–31 (2010).

24.

See Paul G. Mahoney & Adriana Z. Robertson, Advisers by Another Name
44 (Va. L. & Econ., Rsch. Paper No. 2021-01, 2021), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3767087 [https://perma.cc/8LDBTKDS].

25.

See Birdthistle, supra note 1, at 207–08; Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis,
Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of Excessive Fees and
“Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 Yale L.J. 1476, 1525–26 (2015).
The SEC briefly floated the idea of requiring brokers and investment
advisers to assess their clients’ level of sophistication before selling them
certain types of funds, but dropped the proposal upon industry pushback.
See Justin Baer & Paul Kiernan, Leveraged-ETF Seller Urges Investors to
Fight Proposed Regulation, Wall St. J. (Jan. 30, 2020, 8:28 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/leveraged-etf-seller-urges-investors-to-fightproposed-regulation-11580390914 [https://perma.cc/P3NK-WTQT].

26.

Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 Fordham L. Rev.
3389, 3395 (2013).

27.

See Nicole M. Boyson, The Worst of Both Worlds? Dual-Registered
Investment Advisers 1 (Ne. U. D’Amore-McKim Sch. Of Bus., Rsch. Paper
No. 3360537, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3360537 [https://perma.cc/U4VS-D5HF]; Curtis, supra note 18, at 59.

28.

Boyson, supra note 27, at 3; see Curtis, supra note 18, at 56.

29.

Curtis, supra note 18, at 87.

30.

Fisch, et al., supra note 19, at 754–57.
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options in 401(k) plans,31 but there still may be far too many choices
for investors to reasonably parse.32
There are likely many reasons we have not adopted these
measures—including, but not limited to, legal roadblocks33 and the
lobbying power of the financial industry,34—but at least one issue
concerns the inescapable reality that for most retail investors, there
should not be many investment options at all. Most retail investors
would do best with a passive fund that rebalances to limit risk as their
retirement date nears.35 In fact, when the Obama administration
proposed stronger fiduciary obligations for brokers, one of the main
objections was that the rules would, as a practical matter, require
brokers to sell the same limited set of products to all clients.36
That said, however optimal a cheap, simple, passive strategy may
be for retail investors, the curtailment of investors’ choices would result
in an extraordinary concentration within the asset management
industry. There is no need to have multiple competing complexes if
most investors are following a limited set of broad market indexes;
indeed, William Birdthistle proposed that a single asset manager,
31.

Curtis, supra note 18, at 91.

32.

Fisch, et al., supra note 19, at 755–57.

33.

See Chamber of Com. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 885 F.3d 360, 388 (5th Cir.
2018).

34.

Ben McLannahan & Alistair Gray, Lobbyists Prepare New Fight to Reverse
US Fiduciary Rule, Fin. Times (May 23, 2017), https://www.ft.com/
content/3dd4ad40-3ff5-11e7-9d56-25f963e998b2 [https://perma.cc/L5LQ-P
J3Y].

35.

Curtis, supra note 18, at 96.

36.

See, e.g., Andrew Ackerman & Karen Damato, Obama Backs New Rules for
Brokers on Retirement Accounts, Wall St. J. (Feb. 23, 2015, 6:39 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-to-back-new-rules-for-brokers-on-retir
ement-accounts-1424689201 [https://perma.cc/R9ST-LXKK] (“Wall Street
groups warn the rules could crimp investors’ choices by limiting the range of
retirement products brokers can pitch . . . .”); Anthony Scaramucci, Your
401(k) Doesn’t Need a Federal Babysitter, Wall St. J. (Nov. 2, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/your-401-k-doesnt-need-a-federal-babysitter1478042244 [https://perma.cc/M3HB-TGJ8] (warning the rules will “[p]ush
investors excessively into passive index funds”); Michael Wursthorn, Watch
Out, Retirement Savers, Your Choices Are Poised to Shrink, Wall St. J.
(Aug. 18, 2016, 6:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/watch-out-retire
ment-savers-your-choices-are-poised-to-shrink-1471560128 [https://perma.cc
/2VNB-NBD6] (“Some clients will see their investment options diminished
or face the prospect of higher fees.”); Reactions to the Labor Department’s
Fiduciary Rule, Wall St. J. (Apr. 6, 2016, 6:12 PM), https://www.wsj.
com/articles/reactions-to-the-labor-departments-fiduciary-rule-1459954904
[https://perma.cc/5NEV-ZBPB] (“It will encourage more money to flow into
passives, ETFs and low-cost funds, which is not good for traditional asset
management profitability.”).
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BlackRock, handle all of America’s retirement plans.37 That presents a
problem not only for the industry itself, but also for all of corporate
America: through its mutual funds, a single financial institution would
control a sizeable equity stake in every U.S. publicly traded company.
The power and influence represented by holdings of that size would
present a significant economic and political problem: It would allow a
single, private actor to set the agenda for a massive swath of the
economy.
To be sure, that concentration is already occurring. In the past
decade, “[t]he share of assets managed by the five largest firms rose
from 35 percent at year-end 2005 to 53 percent at year-end 2019, and
the share managed by the 10 largest firms increased from 46 percent to
64 percent.”38 The three largest index fund managers, BlackRock,
Vanguard, and State Street, together constitute the largest investor in
88% of the S&P 500,39 with holdings averaging at around 22% per
company, up from 13.5% in 2008.40 Nearly a third of the companies in
the S&P 500 have four or fewer shareholders holding roughly 20% of
their stock.41 The growth and consolidation of the industry has resulted
in “a concentration of corporate ownership, not seen since the days of
J.P. Morgan and J.D. Rockefeller.”42
Numerous commenters have sounded the alarm over the political
power exercised by this kind of concentration of equity ownership
among a very small number of financial institutions.43 That concern is
part of a long American tradition of distrusting—and regulating to
37.

Birdthistle, supra note 1, at 213–14.

38.

Inv. Co. Inst., supra note 3, at 46.

39.

Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden
Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-concentration of
Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 Bus. & Pol. 298, 313
(2017).

40.

David McLaughlin & Annie Massa, The Hidden Dangers of the Great
Index Fund Takeover, Bloomberg Businessweek (Jan. 9, 2020, 12:40
PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-01-09/the-hidden
-dangers-of-the-great-index-fund-takeover [https://perma.cc/9VCW-LM
ZF].

41.

John C. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The
Problem of Twelve 13 (Harvard Pub. L., Working Paper No. 19-07, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3247337 [https://
perma.cc/9NZG-T8Y6].

42.

Fichtner et al., supra note 39, at 315.

43.

Coates, supra note 41, at 2; Fichtner et al., supra note 39, at 319; cf.
Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate
Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 2029,
2128–29 (2019) (recognizing the “policy concerns” raised by the “growing
concentration of equity in the hands of three large players”).
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prevent—concentrated financial power.44 Additionally, some voices
have objected to the popularity of index investing in general, concerned
that it contributes to market inefficiencies.45 Further attempts to limit
mutual fund options would only exacerbate these problems.
In other words, we have a paradox in that the regulatory strategies
that would most benefit America’s retirees would not be optimal for
markets—or the economy—as a whole. And so competition is
maintained in the industry, which ultimately impedes efforts to improve
outcomes for individual savers.

II. Coordination
If one part of the regulatory apparatus encourages competition,
other parts encourage cooperation—specifically, cooperation among
funds within a single complex.
Corporate theory has long grappled with the problem of how to
address agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and
control.46 In any company where the equity owners hire professional
managers, there is a risk that the managers will either shirk their
responsibilities or generally act to advance their own interests rather
than the owners’.47 Yet if the circle of ownership is small, and each
owner has a large stake, they presumably will be able to oversee the
managers’ performance and discipline them for straying from the
owners’ interests. In a public company, however, that oversight is
lessened. Dispersed shareholders may not individually have large
enough stakes to justify the expense of close oversight; as a result, there
44.

Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political
Roots of American Corporate Finance, at xiv–xv (1994); Coates,
supra note 41, at 2–3; see Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Index Funds
and Corporate Governance: Let Shareholders Be Shareholders, 100 B.U.
L. Rev. 1771, 1798 (2020) (recognizing that “BlackRock faces political
risk” from the “historical suspicion of concentrated economic power in the
United States”).

45.

E.g., Alicia McElhaney, Is Passive Investing Making Markets Dumb?,
Inst’l Inv. (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/arti
cle/b1b0glsqj5j134/Is-Passive-Investing-Making-Markets-Dumb [https://
perma.cc/LZ9E-JBU4]; Vladyslav Sushko & Grant Turner, The Implica–
tions of Passive Investing for Securities Markets, BIS Q. Rev., Mar.
2018, at 113, 119, https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1803j.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/6XB8-2PDW]; Luke Kawa, Bernstein: Passive Investing Is
Worse for Society than Marxism, Bloomberg (Aug. 23, 2016, 2:23 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-23/bernstein-passive
-investing-is-worse-for-society-than-marxism [https://perma.cc/XQS4-2L
LD].

46.

Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J.
Corp. L. 493, 498–99 (2018).

47.

See Coates, supra note 41, at 17 .
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is a greater risk of managerial faithlessness.48 Corporate law and
securities regulation have been amended and retheorized repeatedly
over the past several decades to find new solutions to this problem,
including placing greater disclosure obligations on public companies (to
lower the costs of shareholder monitoring),49 and loosening restrictions
on shareholder cooperation (to overcome some of the collective action
costs).50
The rise of institutional shareholders has been a source of hope to
both regulators and theorists alike as a potential solution to
shareholders’ collective action problem. Institutions, the theory goes,
have large enough stakes to make it worthwhile to monitor their
portfolio companies; meanwhile, professionalized management ensures
they have the skills to do so.51
The difficulty is that institutional shareholders are not a monolith.
Many are asset managers that sponsor hundreds of funds, each of which
holds a different, diversified portfolio.52 The asset manager earns fees in
the form of a percentage of assets under management; thus, as asset
size increases, so does the size of the fee.53 Though this would nominally
suggest that the asset managers have an interest in exercising oversight
over portfolio companies so as to increase their value (and thus the
value of the fund, and fees to the manager), in fact, when viewed on a
fund-by-fund basis, each fund’s holdings may not be large enough to
justify the kind of oversight that many theorists seem to want.
As a result, the expectation has been for cooperation over
competition, at least when it comes to stewardship over investments.54
48.

Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 811, 821 (1992).

49.

Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United
States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59
Stan. L. Rev. 1465, 1548 (2007).

50.

John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of
Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. Corp. L. 545,
559–60 (2016).

51.

Div. of Corp. Fin., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Staff Report on
Corporate Accountability: A Re-Examination of Rules Relating
to Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in
the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance
Generally 383 (1980); Black, supra note 48, at 831; Ronald J. Gilson &
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Reevaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Colum. L. Rev.
863, 867 (2013).

52.

Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 43, at 2050.

53.

Kahan & Rock, supra note 44, at 1782.

54.

Numerous academics have extolled the promise of institutional shareholder
monitoring, often assuming that incentives arise from holdings across the
entire family, rather than on a fund-by-fund basis. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock,
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Even though each mutual fund is a separate entity with a distinct
portfolio, most advisors centralize voting behavior.55 The largest asset
managers—which not only manage mutual funds, but also hedge funds
and other kinds of accounts—may also include these entities within
their voting policy.56 Though some fund families may give individual
portfolio managers greater or lesser freedom to go their own way, others
may be quite strict about requiring adherence to the family line.57
Advocates see benefits to encouraging families to pool their votes
as though all of their holdings were part of a single portfolio. When the
entire portfolio is collectivized in this way, the apparent incentives to
exercise oversight over each company—whose shares may be held in
multiple funds—is far greater.58 Moreover, across fund families, asset
managers’ fortunes are tied to the economy as a whole, thus they may
have an interest in promoting corporate governance changes that
benefit society overall.59 For example, large, diversified investors may
supra note 44, at 1785; Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 43, at 2046, 2050, 2080;
See generally Asaf Eckstein, The Virtue of Common Ownership in an Era
of Corporate Compliance, 105 Iowa L. Rev. 507 (2020)(arguing that large
asset managers are well-incentivized and positioned to ensure their portfolio
firms comply with the law).
55.

Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 43, at 2064.

56.

John D. Morley, Too Big to Be Activist, 92 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1407, 1421–
22 (2019); Ann M. Lipton, Family Loyalty: Mutual Fund Voting and
Fiduciary Obligation, 19 Transactions: Tenn. J. Bus. L. 175, 187–89
(2017); Fichtner et al., supra note 39, at 316–17.

57.

Sean J. Griffith & Dorothy S. Lund, Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting in
Corporate Law, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 1151, 1171 (2019); Morley, supra note 56,
at 1421–22; Asaf Eckstein, The Push Toward Corporate Guidelines 18–19
(Oct. 5, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3705140 [https://perma.cc/SL3H-VZVM].
Vanguard and Fidelity have separately delegated voting authority for the
passive and active funds, apparently to avoid aggregation under Section
13(d) of the Exchange Act. See Thomas Franck, Vanguard to Surrender
Some of Its Corporate Voting Power to External Fund Managers, CNBC
(Apr. 25, 2019, 2:26 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/25/vanguardto-give-up-some-of-its-voting-power-to-external-fund-managers.html [https:
//perma.cc/8WKN-SS3Z]; Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Who
Calls the Shots? How Mutual Funds Vote on Director Elections, 3 Harv.
Bus. L. Rev. 35, 49 (2013); see also Morley, supra note 56, at 1423–30.

58.

Kahan & Rock, supra note 44, at 1785–88.

59.

John C. Coffee, The Future of Disclosure: ESG, Common Ownership, and
Systematic Risk 43 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No.
541/2020, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3678197 [https://perma.cc/6XXR-345P]; Jim Hawley & Jon Lukomnik,
The Long and Short of It: Are We Asking the Right Questions? Modern
Portfolio Theory and Time Horizons, 41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 449, 450
(2018).
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want to reduce carbon emissions because climate change damages their
entire portfolio.60 In the wake of the Black Lives Matter movement,
large mutual fund families publicly announced they would monitor their
portfolio investments’ commitment to diversity.61 These may have been
public relations moves, but they also may have reflected an
understanding that racial discrimination harms the economy,62 and thus
harms diversified investors.
The downside to this kind of coordination is that because funds
have different mixes of investments, they may not always have the same
interests. Though a simplistic view of corporate governance posits that
each firm must simply maximize its individual wealth—and each
investor will vote to advance that goal—in fact, a portfolio holder may
find that wealth maximization at an individual company does not equal
wealth maximization at the fund level. For example, portfolios that
include both stock and debt in a single company may vote the stock in
a way that maximizes the value of the debt, while pure stockholders
would choose a different strategy.63 A fund might rationally vote to
encourage an oil company to reduce carbon emissions—even at the
expense of the oil company’s profits—if the specter of climate change
was damaging other investments in the portfolio.64 But that means that
a nondiversified energy fund might prefer that the oil company
60.

Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 Wash. L.
Rev. 1, 4–6 (2020).

61.

Billy Nauman, US Investors Demand Data in Fight Against Racial
Discrimination, Fin. Times (July 27, 2020), https://www.ft.com/con
tent/1dffac98-fd4e-4288-8683-8f84e236d335 [https://perma.cc/UYV4-FP
JJ]; Billy Nauman, State Street to Insist Companies Disclose Diversity
Data, Fin. Times (Jan. 10, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/2e512c764733-4821-8425-136ab9b98426 [https://perma.cc/T3PJ-WPUR].

62.

See Adedayo Akala, Cost Of Racism: U.S. Economy Lost $16 Trillion
Because of Discrimination, Bank Says, NPR (Sept. 23, 2020, 2:42 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020
/09/23/916022472/cost-of-racism-u-s-economy-lost-16-trillion-because-of-di
scrimination-bank-says [https://perma.cc/Y3YS-LRT8]; Steve Matthews &
Catarina Saraiva, Fed Finds Race, Gender Disparities Cut U.S. GDP by
$2.6 Trillion, Bloomberg (Feb. 2, 2021, 11:32 AM), https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-02/fed-finds-race-gender-disparitiescut-u-s-gdp-by-2-6-trillion [https://perma.cc/R85R-YCMY].

63.

Lipton, supra note 56, at 190; see also Tao Chen, Li Zhang & Qifei Zhu,
Dual Ownership and Risk-taking Incentives in Managerial Compensation 1
(July 26, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3427030 [https://perma.cc/LBG4-3TM3]; Aneel
Keswani, Anh Tran & Paolo Volpin, Institutional Debt Holder Governance
28–29 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 613/2019, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3282394 [https://pe
rma.cc/XM8V-DRRT].

64.

Condon, supra note 60, at 5–6.
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maximize its profits, and treating all of the funds as though they were
part of one portfolio elides these differences.65 The more that fund
families sponsor niche funds, the more these differences are exacerbated.
For example, sustainability funds sponsored by large index providers
like BlackRock and Vanguard, apparently vote against environmental
and social proposals when it is in the interests of the fund family to do
so.66
In other words, vote coordination may allow institutional share–
holders to fulfill their promise as corporate stewards, but just as
breaking funds up into competitive families sacrifices the interests of
retail investors in favor of a broader economic plan, allowing funds to
coordinate their votes to benefit the economy sacrifices the interests of
investors who may only hold shares in a single fund.67
To be sure, it may be perfectly reasonable for individual portfolio
managers, acting in the interests of a particular fund, to direct the fund
to vote its shares with the family. Votes are only valuable en masse; it
may be rational for a fund to “sacrifice” its interests on certain votes
in order to receive the benefits of speaking with a single voice on other

65.

Lipton, supra note 56, at 190; Griffith & Lund, supra note 57, at 1182–86;
Sean J. Griffith, Opt-In Stewardship: Toward an Optimal Delegation of
Mutual Fund Voting Authority, 98 Tex. L. Rev. 983, 1013–14 (2020);
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of
Institutional Investors, 31 J. Econ. Persps. 89, 99 (2017) (“[T]he fact that
a given actively managed fund is overweight in a particular corporation
might be offset by the fact that other actively managed funds within the
same fund family might be underweight. The investment manager of the
fund family will have an incentive to bring about an increase in value only
if its actively managed funds are on the whole overweight in this corporation
. . . .”); Morley, supra note 56, at 1439–41.

66.

See Roni Michaely, Guillem Ordonez-Calafi, & Silvina Rubio, ES Votes that
Matter, (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper, Paper No.
774/2021, 2021) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=38
84917 [https://perma.cc/7XVT-P89B].

67.

Vanguard’s structure could—but in practical effect does not—break the
mold. As described above, Vanguard, like all asset managers, collects fees
based on the size of its funds; its incentives to oversee portfolio companies
therefore arise, in large part, from the fact that if its funds increase in
value, Vanguard’s fees increase as well. Unusually, however, the Vanguard
asset manager is owned by its funds; thus, theoretically, each fund benefits
when Vanguard itself benefits, giving each fund an (indirect) stake in the
performance of the other funds in the family. John Morley, The Separation
of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and
Regulation, 123 Yale L.J. 1228, 1276 (2014). But Vanguard uses a set of
contractual devices to eliminate each fund’s claim on the residual earnings
of the management company. Id. at 1276–77. Thus, though on the surface
each of Vanguard’s funds might seem to have an interest in the success of
the others, Vanguard has chosen to eliminate that shared interest.
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matters.68 The difficulty is that there is little reason to believe fund
managers are in fact conducting that level of analysis; voting policy
within a family is dictated from the top down.
Oddly, although this practice arguably violates funds’ fiduciary
duties under federal and state law,69 it has not (yet) been the focus of
regulatory attention.70 Eventually, however, regulators will have to
determine what funds’ obligations are with respect to vote pooling.
Their policy choices will reflect their view of the proper balance between
using mutual fund complexes as a tool to oversee the economy, versus
their immediate obligations to retail clients.
But if the regulatory system encourages the proliferation of funds
out of a distrust of concentrated economic power, the problem is simply
reproduced when massive fund families are permitted to coordinate
their voting behavior. Indeed, the real-world effects of this concentrated
power may already be exhibiting themselves; several researchers have
argued that when a fund family takes large stakes in firms in the same
industry, competition between the firms is lessened, to the detriment of
other stakeholders.71
One solution, proposed by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst, would
be to limit the holdings of mutual fund families to 5% of a given
company’s stock, which, they argue, is enough to provide incentives for
oversight but not so high an amount as to create undue economic

68.

Lipton, supra note 56, at 196–97.

69.

See id. at 192–95.

70.

But see Elad L. Roisman, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote
Remarks: ICI Mutual Funds and Investment Management Conference
(Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-roisman-031819
[https://perma.cc/657M-57WG] (expressing the SEC commissioner’s con–
cern about centralized voting).

71.

Martin C. Schmalz, Common-Ownership Concentration and Corporate
Conduct 9 (CESifo Working Paper No. 6908, 2018), https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3046829 [https://perma.cc/JC5T-AS
33]; Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1267, 1279
(2016); Miguel Antón, Florian Ederer, Mireia Giné & Martin C. Schmalz,
Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives 1 (Eur.
Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 511/2017, 2021) https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2802332 [https://perma.cc/
NJR9-Q96Y]; Jose Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anticompetitive
Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. Fin. 1513 (2018); see also Zohar
Goshen & Doran Levit, Common Ownership and the Decline of the
American Worker, (Columbia L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 653, 2021)
(arguing that concentration of ownership among a small number of large
mutual fund families contributes to wage stagnation) https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3832069 [https://perma.cc/UJ5M-6Q8
K].
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concentration.72 This, again, though, might encourage the fracturing of
the mutual fund industry, with the dysfunction that follows.
Meanwhile, Eric Posner, Fiona Morton, and E. Glen Weyl contend that
mutual funds’ outsized power over the economy is tied to their
diversification, and therefore fund families should be limited in their
ability to own stocks in competing companies.73 That might encourage
improved corporate oversight74 but not only would further encourage
market fracturing among mutual fund complexes,75 it may also worsen
outcomes for the retail shareholders who would bear less diversified risk.

III. Regulatory Misfires
Rather than move in these directions, regulators have sought to
disrupt shareholder coordination by targeting all investors generally
rather than mutual funds specifically. For example, a recent bete noir
of companies chafing under investor oversight has been the proxy
advisor system. Proxy advisors, like ISS and Glass-Lewis, analyze the
myriad issues that appear on corporate proxy ballots, and issue reports
to institutional investors offering commentary and voting recommen–
dations.76 Through this process, proxy advisors make it easier for
shareholders to coordinate their votes and express coherent preferences.
Though many have accused institutional investors of blindly following
proxy advisors’ recommendations,77 the matter is not so simple: ISS and
Glass-Lewis tailor their recommendations to the preferences of large
institutions,78 and may serve more of an “agenda-setting” function by
72.

Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 43, at 2129; see also Goshen & Levit, supra
note 71 (recommending limits on assets under management).

73.

Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to
Limit the Anticompetitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81 Antitrust
L.J. 669, 672, 724 (2017).

74.

Depending, of course, of one’s definition of improved, eliminating common
ownership might eliminate incentives to reduce systemic risk, see supra
notes 72–73 and accompanying text, or industry-wide compliance risk, see
Asaf Eckstein, supra note 54, at 511–12.

75.

Their proposal would make exceptions for some “pure” index funds that
remained entirely passive, and for families that limited the size of their
holdings, which presumably would encourage a proliferation of families.

76.

Andrew F. Tuch, Proxy Advisor Influence in a Comparative Light, 99
B.U. L. Rev. 1459, 1464 (2019).

77.

E.g., Paul Rose, Robovoting and Proxy Vote Disclosure 1 (Nov. 26, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=3486322 [https://perma.cc/W9SQ-Y8S3].

78.

Asaf Eckstein, The Push Toward Corporate Guidelines 58 (Oct. 14, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=3705140 [https://perma.cc/HPB7-GSK5]; Stephen Choi, Jill
Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?,
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identifying key matters in what would otherwise be a cacophony of
issues that are presented to shareholders every year.79
In recognition of proxy advisors’ rising influence, the SEC recently
proposed rules that would have required, among other things, that
proxy advisors distribute drafts of their reports to issuing companies
for their comment before sending them to investors.80 These rules would
have made it far more expensive for proxy advisors to operate, and
incentivized them toward recommending that shareholders vote with
management.81 The final rules are less draconian; among other things,
they only require that issuers be given a copy of the report at the same
time that it is distributed to investors, and that the proxy advisor send
its clients hyperlinks to any issuer responses.82 But additional SEC
guidance warning institutional investors of their duty to review issuer
responses before casting a ballot may disrupt or burden the voting
process.83
Rule 14a-8 is another mechanism by which shareholders coordinate
with each other and express preferences about how corporations should
be run.84 Rule 14a-8 allows shareholders to include proposals on the
corporate proxy ballot for other shareholders to vote on. They are
typically used to advocate for particular governance arrangements—
such as destaggered boards, the separation of the chair and CEO roles,
and so forth—or to request that the company engage on social and

59 Emory L.J. 869, 883 (2010); Chong Shu, The Proxy Advisory Industry:
Influencing and Being Influenced 3–4, (Dec. 22, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=36143
14 [https://perma.cc/3E4Q-WN2Q].
79.

Douglas Sarro, Proxy Advisors as Issue Spotters, 15 Brook. J. Corp. Fin.
& Com. L. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 3), available at https://pap
ers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3699227 [https://perma.cc/R4
VW-L8HG].

80.

Amendments to Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Voting
Advice, 84 Fed. Reg. 66,518 (proposed Dec. 4, 2019) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 240).

81.

Robert J. Jackson Jr., Statement on Proposals to Restrict Shareholder
Voting, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/
public-statement/statement-jackson-2019-11-05-open-meeting [https://per
ma.cc/AJ9X-GXJQ] (calling the proposal a “tax” on “anti-management
advice”).

82.

Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Voting Advice, 85 Fed. Reg.
55,082, 55,110 & n.346 (Sept. 3, 2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).

83.

See Supplement to Commission Guidance Regarding Proxy Voting
Responsibilities of Investment Advisers, 85 Fed. Reg. 55,155, 55,157 (Sept.
3, 2020).

84.

Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020).
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environmental issues, such as being more transparent about political
spending or workforce diversity and pay disparities.85
Shareholder proposals are influential not just at the targeted
corporation, but also at a wide swath of companies, because a favorable
vote on a particular proposal sends a signal to other corporations as to
what shareholders demand. The votes also allow shareholders to see
what other shareholders are thinking and learn from it. Merely putting
a proposal on the ballot allows ISS and Glass-Lewis to comment on the
proposal, which makes it easier for shareholders to form their own
judgments. Through shareholder proposals, markets can come to
consensus about various corporate reforms.
In a recent rulemaking, the SEC dramatically restricted
shareholders’ ability to use Rule 14a-8, imposing much higher owner–
ship thresholds before shareholders can offer a proposal, and limiting
shareholders’ ability to re-propose failed proposals in successive years.86
These changes may be rolled back by the Biden Administration, but
assuming they take effect, they would limit investors’ ability to
coordinate with each other and exercise control over their portfolio
companies.
The ironic side effect of these actions, though, will likely be to
enhance the power of the largest mutual fund families while minimizing
the power of other shareholders. So long as the largest families
coordinate their voting behavior across their funds, they do not need to
use the proposal process to communicate their desires to management;
they simply need to make a phone call.87 They have sufficient in-house
resources to determine their corporate governance preferences without

85.

E.g., Philip Stamatakos & Joel May, How to Respond to Shareholder
Proposals Seeking Board Declassification, Deal Laws., Jan.–Feb. 2011, at
1 (discussing board de-staggering); Craig McGuire, What is a Shareholder
Proposal?, S’holder Activist, http://theshareholderactivist.com/share
holder-activism-spotlight/what-is-a-shareholder-proposal/ [https://perma.cc
/KBF7-ZLM6] (last visited Mar. 13, 2021) (“Some typical uses of
shareholder proposals are to address issues with management compensation,
change shareholder voting rights, focus on a policy related to a social or
environmental issue, or to advocate for corporate charitable contributions.”).

86.

Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds Under Exchange
Act Rule 14a-8, 85 Fed. Reg. 70,240 (Nov. 4, 2020) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 240).

87.

See Brandon Rees, Deputy Dir. Corps. & Cap. Mkts., Am. Fed’n of Lab.
and Cong. Indus. Orgs., Security and Exchange Commission Round Table
on the Proxy Process 150:8–16 (Nov. 15, 2018) (“Large institutional
investors—the Blackrocks and State Streets and Vanguards of the world—
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call within 24 hours.”).
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relying as heavily on proxy advisors,88 and they can coordinate
preferences in private conferences with other large investors.89
If Rule 14a-8 proposals are rarer, that only means that the very
largest asset managers will not be forced to take public positions on
matters of corporate governance, while still maintaining their ability to
influence corporate managers in private. They are not obligated to
disclose voting policies on matters that never come up for a vote. If it
becomes harder or more expensive for ISS and Glass-Lewis to operate,
the coordination costs will be felt by the smaller shareholders who rely
more on their counsel, leaving it to the giants alone to influence
corporate policy.
In other words, moves targeted at disrupting shareholder
coordination will have the ironic effect of increasing the influence of the
largest asset managers, and reducing their transparency and account–
ability to the public.

IV. A Balancing Act
There may be no obvious way out of this dilemma, in a world where
we both encourage, and discourage, the enormous accumulation of
capital. Asset managers need to be just disaggregated enough not to
represent a political threat, but not so disaggregated that predatory
funds proliferate and their ability to exercise oversight over portfolio
companies is undermined. Improvement in one direction causes
deterioration in another.
At least one possibility is to recognize, and remedy, the fact that
America is uniquely reliant on private savings to protect people in
retirement. Many countries have a more robust public retirement
system to serve as a safety net; American Social Security benefits are
stingy by comparison.90 That puts enormous pressure on private savings
to provide basic needs that are uniform across most of the population.
If these needs were met via government benefits, there really would be
an appropriate market, targeted to wealthier beneficiaries, for tailored
and varied private retirement options. This class of savers might also
be sophisticated enough to avoid more predatory plans.91 Redirecting
savings from private actors to a government plan might also lessen the
power of the investment giants, which would satisfy political concerns,
while possibly leaving them still large enough to engage in effective
stewardship over portfolio companies. Moreover, if the power of these
88.

Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 43, at 2078.

89.

Coates, supra note 41, at 15.

90.

See generally Mercer & CFA Inst., Glob. Pension Index 8 (2020)
(assigning grades to various systems throughout the world).

91.

Cf. Fisch et al., supra note 19, at 743–44 (noting that involuntary workplace
investors, by contrast, are not sophisticated enough to avoid more predatory
plans).
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giants is lessened by redirecting a portion of what is now private savings
into a government pension, there might be less discomfort with stronger
regulation that functionally eliminates the more predatory funds and
families entirely.
There may also be regulatory mechanisms to balance the competing
goals of preserving fund families’ oversight capabilities, minimizing
their political power, and protecting the distinct interests of investors
in each fund.
One option is, in a sense, architectural: regulators could mute, but
not eliminate, the families’ influence by introducing friction into the
coordination process. For example, the legal rule could be that families
are obligated to vote each fund’s shares in the best interests of that
fund, and that each fund manager must be given the freedom to vote
independently of other funds in the family. Then, some degree of
documentation could be required to demonstrate that any coordination
among funds’ votes was reviewed by each fund board to ensure that the
interests of each fund were protected. The substantive goal would be
to ensure that when votes are pooled, it is done because that is in the
best interests of each fund individual, and to permit the possibility of
divergent votes, so as to blunt families’ voting power. At the same time,
however, the paperwork obligations alone could deter funds from
pooling votes on minor matters, while still being worth the price for the
more significant votes. Thus, in real ways, the influence of mutual fund
families could be mitigated while still preserving their ability to act as
corporate stewards overall.
The introduction of administrative friction into the decisionmaking
process has a long pedigree as a mechanism for inhibiting the exercise
of power.92 Though it may seem like an arbitrary imposition of costs, in
practical effect it imposes a tax, in the form of administrative
paperwork, on certain types of actions, ensuring that they will only be
taken if the benefit exceeds the cost of the tax. Because mutual funds
have more information and ability to calculate the benefits of action
than do regulators, such a tax could be an appropriate compromise
mechanism to disrupt their voice without eliminating it for matters on
which all funds have similar interests.
There might be other ways to ensure that the managers of
individual funds within a family pursue each fund’s best interest when
it comes to stewardship, whether that means coordinating with the
other funds in the family or breaking with them. For example, as above,
mutual fund asset managers charge fees based on the total assets under
management.93 This is not a performance fee; though fees increase when
92.

See Ann M. Lipton, Beyond Internal and External: A Taxonomy of
Mechanisms for Regulating Corporate Conduct, 2020 Wisc. L. Rev. 657,
671–77.

93.

Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 43, at 2053.
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asset managers’ stewardship increases the value of the funds, the fees
also increase or decrease based on investor inflows and outflows.
Nonetheless, it is common practice for mutual fund families to
compensate individual portfolio managers—who are in charge of
handling particular funds—for performance, at least when the fund is
actively, rather than passively, managed.94 Researchers have found that
these performance incentives for the portfolio managers have an effect
on fund performance.95
Regulators might therefore require that all portfolio managers—
both index and active—receive some performance compensation based
on increases to the value of the portfolio, as well as requiring that each
fund manager be given the freedom to coordinate, or not, with the other
funds in the family when engaged in voting and stewardship activities.
Fund managers might also be given freedom to decide whether the
stocks in their funds would be available for lending to short sellers—
which might generate fees for the fund—or whether instead they would
remain in the portfolio, where they would be available for voting on
particular matters.96 With this kind of framework, families would still
be able to leverage their power through the use of common research
and resources that serve all of their funds,97 and in many cases, portfolio
managers might choose to cooperate with each other in order to benefit
from the increased influence that coordination brings. But managers
might also have incentives to defect from the family on particular
occasions, which would disrupt the more troubling aspects of mutual
fund families’ power, while ensuring that funds’ differing interests
would be respected.

Conclusion
At the end of the day, the problem may be that we have put too
much public responsibility on private actors. In addition to expecting
mutual funds to fund retirement in a manner that, in other countries,
94.
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Edwin Hu, Joshua Mitts & Haley Sylvester, The Index-Fund Dilemma: An
Empirical Study of the Lending-Voting Tradeoff 2 (N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Rsch.
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https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3673531 [https://pe
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might be a governmental responsibility, we increasingly rely on
institutional investors to do the work of policing corporate misbehavior.
Certainly, the exhortations for mutual funds to use their investment
dollars to combat climate change,98 structural racism,99 corporate
political spending,100 gun violence,101 and sexual orientation discrim–
ination,102 gives the impression that mutual funds are being tasked with
governmental responsibilities. They cannot both have that power, and
not have it; eventually, a choice will have to be made.
To some extent, the largest mutual funds may eventually make the
choice themselves; as this Article goes to press, BlackRock announced
that it was exploring a program by which investors in its funds would
have the option to choose how their proportionate share of the fund
would vote.103 Depending on how this program is implemented and the
number of investors who accept the invitation, BlackRock’s influence
on corporate governance could be significantly muted, with power
redistributed to uncoordinated and indirect—and therefore less
impactful—fund investors.
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